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BACKGROUND AND REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE
Stanley N. Barnes f
This prologue discusses broad questions relating to the purpose,
organization and general import of the Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws.1 The an-
swers to these questions seem indispensable to any evaluation of either
the Report or the articles contained in this symposium. First, why
was the Committee formed? Second, who were its members? Finally,
what general significance does the Report have?
FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE
Some years ago the late Mr. Justice Jackson observed: "If there
is one thing that the people are entitled to expect from their law
makers, it is rules of law that will enable individuals to tell whether
they are married and, if so, to whom." 2 Almost but not quite as im-
portant are guides in the antitrust field. The same Justice, commenting
less euphemistically on antitrust laws, observed: "A half century of
litigation and judicial interpretation has not made the law either under-
standable or respected." "
To ease the hazards of uncertainty and increase public respect for
antitrust, Attorney General Brownell soon after his appointment
set up a National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws. On
March 31, 1955, that group rendered its Report. Now gathered
together for the first time in one document is an authoritative view-
and occasionally several alternative versions-of most major decisions
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Thus the Committee sought to
aid antitrust enforcement by creating a useful guide to businessmen and
their. counsel who seek in good faith to live within the law, and who
necessarily must first know what it is. In addition, this guide to what
the law is should be of real help to those who consider what the law
should be.
t Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. Co-
Chairman, Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws.
1. Hereinafter cited as REPORT.
2. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 553 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
3. Jackson & Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts, 86. U. PA. L. Ray. 231,
256 (1938).
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Second, the Report sought to suggest broad areas requiring fur-
ther factual inquiry.4 The Committee made no new factual inquiries,
for it had no subpoena power, no large research staff, no provision for
public hearings and equally important, no sufficient funds. This by
no stretch means that the Report was made without regard for the
facts of antitrust enforcement. The Committee built upon the ac-
cumulated teachings of data already gathered, and, where such data
overwhelmingly pointed to one conclusion, the Committee made recom-
mendations based on factual judgments.
However, where members split on the teaching of existing data,
the Committee suggested the need for further inquiry. For example,
compare the Committee's recommendations on "fair trade" with those
on organized labor and regulated industries. In treating "fair trade,"
almost all members agreed that the economic consequences of legalized
resale price maintenance constituted an ". . . unwarranted com-
promise of the basic tenets of National antitrust policy." ' In con-
trast, treating organized labor apart from reported decisions, the Com-
mittee could not generalize as to the extent there exist commercial
restraints which are not effectively curbed by antitrust law or the
Labor-Management Relations Act. Accordingly, the Committee left
to Congress the task of determining "the extent" to which such com-
mercial restraints exist unchecked. Similarly, in treating dual con-
ference rate agreements under the Shipping Act, the Committee noted
the necessity for a new factual judgment concerning, first, the role of
shipping conference activity in our national shipping policy, and sec-
ond, the necessity of dual rate systems to such conferences.
No scholar or congressional committee will take this Commit-
tee's word for those areas where existing data clearly point to one
conclusion. Nonetheless this Report may offer leads for antitrust
policymakers to areas where further inquiry may be profitable.
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE
Who were the Committee's members? The Committee's sixty-
one members included practicing lawyers, law professors and econo-
mists-articulate spokesmen for major points of view on issues of
antitrust policy. On the one hand, members included men who had
long served the Antitrust Division. Among these were the late As-
sistant Attorney General Wendell Berge, Kenneth Kimble, A. Stewart
4. At the outset, the Report states its ". . . aim is not to add to the storehouse
of statistical data or to survey the economic effects of antitrust applications to spe-
cific industries." REPORT at 4.
5. Id. at 154.
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Kerr, Louis B. Schwartz, Hammond E. Chaffetz and Cyrus V. Ander-
son. On the other hand, men were also included who counsel all types
and sizes of business enterprises. Thus we sought the fairest repre-
sentation for all possible points of view.
Since the Report's publication, two barbs have been aimed at the
Committee's composition. First, debate over the Report's content
has occasionally been obscured by charges that, since some members
have represented defendants in Department of Justice antitrust actions,
their contribution to the Report's analysis and recommendations was
inevitably prejudiced. Second, some critics allege that advice by a
Committee composed in part of members of the executive branch and,
in the main, of private citizens usurps Congress' function of legislation.
The facts, revealed by my staff's search of the Department files,
are these: At the time the composition of the Committee was an-
nounced, some fifteen of the Committee's sixty-one members were
representing defendants in pending proceedings brought by the Anti-
trust Division. From 1946 to date, only twenty-four of the Commit-
tee's sixty-one members represented defendants in cases, pending or
closed, brought by the Department of Justice. These figures, of
course, tell only a small part of the story. Eight of these twenty-four
members, at some time in their careers, served in the Antitrust Division
and thirteen of them have enjoyed, or regretted, some experience rep-
resenting treble damage complainants. Finally, the other two-thirds
of the Committee included outstanding law professors, economists and
citizens with broad experience in areas other than antitrust litigation.
Criticism of the Committee's membership, based on lawyer mem-
bers' connections with antitrust defendants misses the mark. A
lawyer's occasional representation of one point of view does not pro-
duce his complete identification with that view. A client's interest
is only one basis for a lawyer's identification. Some others, for
example, are social and political affiliations. In appraising antitrust
issues, totiching as they do basic political and social overtones, it is
the complex of all these interests-not solely the experience of client
affiliation-which determines any individual's attitudes.
Second, what about the appropriateness of executive-public ad-
visory committees in the antitrust areas? Congressman Patman
queried the advisability of a study ". . . of the antitrust laws before
the recognized constitutionally established and legally established com-
mittees of the Congress" as compared with a process like the Attorney
General's Committee." The two paths of study are not mutually ex-
6. Statement of Congressman Patman in Hearings Before the Special Committee
of the Senate To Study Problems of Smnall Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 514 (1955).
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clusive. Thus, copies of the Report of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee were sent to all interested congressional committees. Indeed, four
congressional committees have already held hearings on the substance
of that Report. It seems clear that the Report may be as useful to the
Congress as to the public generally.
At least some members of Congress have recognized the value
of the unique role committees composed of non-legislators may play.
For example, United States Senator Ives of New York proposed wider
use of investigating commissions made up of public citizens as well
as legislators. Studies by members of the public at large, he explained,
may serve two ". . . crucial functions: First, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that the inclusion of men not presently active in the political arena
would minimize those excesses which sometimes come with potential
political motivation. There would be added further the benefits of the
increased perspective which comes with active participation by commis-
sion members from outside the halls of Congress. And secofild, by
requiring fewer legislators on the investigating commissions, this pro-
posal would result in a decrease in the work-load for the presently over-
burdened legislation branch of the Government." 7
Finally, Congressman Patman's query raised, more broadly, the
pros and cons of any sort of public advisory committee. At the present
time there are some 5,500 advisory committees utilized by the Federal
Government. Many may cover areas fit also for congressional inquiry.
Nonetheless, few challenge that such public advisory groups may form
a crucial link of communication between the Government and those
citizens it serves.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THaE REPORT
What general significance does the Report have? Let me answer
this question, first, by citing the judgment of others, and, second, by
reference to the Report itself.
As the late Wendell Berge, Thurman Arnold's successor as As-
sistant Attorney General, put it: "I think that the Report . . . rep-
resents a signal contribution to antitrust problems. . . . It is my
judgment that the Report strongly supports the basic purposes of
the antitrust laws. It should receive sympathetic consideration of those
members of Congress who have consistently supported the free enter-
prise system." '
7. See S. REs. 3775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
8. Hearings Before the Select Committee of the Senate on the Report of the
Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 61-62 (1955).
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In like tenor, Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School,
said: "The Committee Report is a serious document meriting serious
consideration. It should help more than any similar document in re-
cent years to direct attention to genuine problems of policy in the field.
.. It strongly supports the Sherman Act, and the recent vigorous
Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. The Report flatly repudiates
the plausible argument, backed by several Committees, books and ar-
ticles in recent years, to exempt so-called 'progressive' monopolies and
combinations from the antitrust laws by broadening the rule of reason.
It firmly approves the doctrine of per se illegality developed by the
courts, and refuses to propose any weakening of the Sherman Act in its
application to foreign commerce." 9
To turn to the Report itself, it states at the outset that this Com-
mittee without exception ". . . adheres to antitrust fundamentals
with full vigor. Although many forces and other Government policies
have materially promoted our creative American economy, we believe
the antitrust laws remain one of the most important." 10 The Report
later concludes: ". . . a backward look across the 64 years since
the Sherman Act reveals on the whole a healthy process of growth
through which antitrust fundamentals have gained in strength and
effectiveness." "'
These findings can best be valued in the context of recent attacks
on much of antitrust. Such forays stemmed from a wide range of
sources. On the one hand, David Lillienthal, after a debatable re-
statement of present antitrust doctrine, concluded: "It is untenable
to say that the broad provisions of basic policy in the antitrust laws
can bear no other reasonable construction than that now being put
upon them, a construction so at variance with the public interest." 1
Similarly, Professor Kenneth Galbraith felt antitrust enforcement might
well profit from a ". . . more precise and conscious use of the dis-
tinction between original and countervailing power. . . . " ' He
feels there is no justification ". . . for attacking positions of counter-
vailing power which leaves positions of original market power un-
touched." "' The 1953 Business Advisory Council Report emphasized:
"The statutes, the court decisions and administrative rulings which
make up Antitrust Law tend to impede effective competition as often
9. Ibid.
10. RFPORT at 2.
11. Id. at 3.
12. LILLIENTHAL, BIG BusiNEss: A NEW ERA 174 (1953).
13. GAL rATH, AmmcAN CAPTALISm, THE CONCEPT oF COUNTERVAILING
POwER 145 (1952).
14. Id. at 144.
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as they protect it from abuse." " Against this background, the Com-
mittee's vigorous reassertion of antitrust, I believe, takes on real
meaning.
By stating a prevailing and authoritative view of significant anti-
trust issues, the Report should encourage good faith compliance by
American business that seeks to live within the law. For the first
time since the passage of the Sherman Act, a group of antitrust ex-
perts, representing all shades of opinion, have attempted to set down
views on the major issues of antitrust. This comprehensive review and
restatement, stating both prevailing and occasional dissenting views,
should materially aid those who counsel all sizes of American enterprise.
15. BusiNEss ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE ON
EicnnrE COMrITmON (1951).
